These two books address themselves to problems of ineffective government in post-colonial Dahomey (now B6nin), but from quite different perspectives. Ronen applies a variant of modernization theory, while Gl616 works from reflections on the history of the Abomey kingdom. Of the two, Ronen's is simpler and clearer, especially as a summary of Dahomean political narrative. Gl616's work, however, is more original and shows more promise for future analysis.
Ronen maintains that Dahomey's political instability resulted from its inability to integrate modern institutions with traditional values. He concludes that centuries of precolonial contact with Europeans did not influence Dahomey except by creating an elite group, the Brazilians. The separation of the elite from the masses through the device of education is his main theme for the period 1900-1945.
The postwar period brought elections to Dahomey, and by the early 1950s the electoral organizations had assumed a regional character: one for Porto-Novo and its surroundings, one for Abomey and its surroundings, and one for the North. This, says Ronen, shows Maurice Gl616's study is not the comprehensive analysis we seek, but it provides some fascinating clues. The book is divided into two largely separate studies: a cross-sectional study of the institutions of the kingdom of Dahomey (or Danxome, following Gll6's more meticulous orthography) which is, in a sense, a celebration of the Fon kingdom; followed by a study of political change among kings and chiefs since the French conquest, aimed at demonstrating that local chiefs provide an institution on which modern Dahomey may build an effective political system. Both sections are based on written sources and on oral evidence collected by GIle'.
The author is of the country's elite, both traditional and modern, and he is a nationalist. At the same time he is an intellectual attempting a critical evaluation of his country's prospects for advancement. GI1I1 is more direct, opinionated and personal than most African scholars. This perspective seems to me to provide the strength of his book.
The first part of the book adds somewhat to available evidence on the kingdom of Dahomey, and may thus be set alongside such sources as Le Heriss6 (1911) and Herskovits (1938). G161k follows Le Heriss6 and Le Herisse's oral sources on many points of interpretation. He treats Herskovits more cautiously, principally because of a dispute with Rene Aho, a prince who was Herskovits' principal informant. GIleI asserts that the principal objective of the kingdom was territorial expansion (as Le Herris6 argues) rather than profits from the slave trade (as many others, including Herskovits to an extent, have argued). Particular attention is given to the institution of vidax6 or crown prince. Ahanhanzo, Maurice Gll1's great-grandfather, was vidax6 under King G1~11 until his sudden death in 1874. Bitterness resulted between the followers of Ahanhanzo and those of B~hanzin, who subsequently became vidax6 and then king from 1889 to 1894. Maurice GI1I1 implies, for instance, that B~hanzin was left-handed and should not therefore have become king.
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GI~1~ emphasizes the Fon rule against putting princes in high office for fear of their personal ambition, and yet the steady trend to placing more and more princes in high officewhich trend continued in the twentieth century.
It also appears, however, that G1616 intends his study of precolonial Danxomq as a device for commenting on modern Dahomey. For example, the Soglos are given attention as the military companions of the Fon kings from the earliest days -Gen. Christophe Sogle was, of course, twice president of Dahomey. Yet Gl616 also states that a military coup would have been impossible in precolonial Dahomey. He asserts that Danxomq had become a nation-state by the late nineteenth century, and that government depended on the careful maintenance of a broad consensus. It is clearly implied that these are standards modern B6nin should seek to emulate.
But the most clearly useful part of the book is the second. Glel6 shows the steps by which, under the impact of French pressure and policy, Dahomey and its royal family were split into a variety of factions. The kingdom was partitioned upon conquest, and only a quarter of the kingdom was left to the throne. Secondly, a split occurred between the partisans of the deposed B6hanzin and those of Agoli-Agbo, his brother who was placed on the throne by the French.
The third split was the establishment of the "proconsulate" of the chefs de canton following the deposition of Agoli-Agbo in 1900. The cercle of Abomey was divided into cantons, and a chief selected for each. The majority of these chiefs were of royal blood -a violation, therefore, of the rule against giving offices to princes. Each of these promptly had himself installed with the rituals of a king of Dahomey. To maintain their position and the favour of the administration they restricted education, for example, and made no move to constitute political parties. G1616 labels them "grand electors."
A further dispute then arose as to who would be considered king or head of the royal family. Certain energetic chefs de canton aspired to the title. One of them, Justin Aho, convinced an apparently credulous I. A. Akinjogbin in Paris that he ought to be recognized as king.2 The preponderance of opinion gives the position to Sagbaju, a son of king G1616 who is now a century old, and who technically acts as leader of ceremonies for the royal ancestors.
It is certainly striking that the Fon, who were so politically dominant up to 1893, have never dominated colonial or independent Dahomey. Their large population and prior leadership would seem almost automatically to make them the leading force in the country. But two sorts of reasons emerge for their weakness. Firstly, the French dismembered the kingdom and relentlessly split Fon leaders. Secondly, tensions within the Fon system. The kingdom relied on the selection of a unique leader. The more it became possible for princes to gain political office, the greater became the tendency to form factions within the kingdom. These factions have continued to neutralise each other, in both the "traditional" and "modern" sectors.
Justin Ahomadegb6, therefore, was never able to gain the complete support of Abomey and Ouidah. The founder and head of UDD, a party based in Abomey, he began in the 1950s to represent himself as a member of the royal family, though his tie was through marriage to the descendant of an eighteenth-century king. The partisans of B6hanzin supported UDD, but the partisans of Agoli-Agbo supported the PRD of Sourou-Migan Apithy. And the chefs de canton could never be brought into a single political organization. Consistent failure of the UDD to get solid support in Abomey and Ouidah cost it election after election.
Gl616's conclusion is stated more as an article of faith than as a proposition whose value has been demonstrated. He believes that a strong local government structure is necessary, and he believes that village chiefs, the only surviving political institution from precolonial Dahomey, still provide the best hope for such a local government structure.
Ronen presents the chiefs as an obstacle to political development; GII61 presents them as the main hope. Ronen suggests that the Dahomeans need new attitudes; G1616 believes they need new institutions. Ronen's survey of recent political events is set against a shallow background of history, including a stereotyped notion of traditionalism. He assumes, for example, that having royal princes as chefs de canton represents tradition, and explains the relative order in the region of Abomey. Gl616 shows the power of the chefs de canton to be an innovation, and suggests that order existed because of an alliance of chiefs and administration. Ronen has summarized Dahomean politics to permit it to be compared to other countries; GI616 has begun a synthesis of Dahomean history to facilitate an attack on its current problems.
